Endogenous Market Structure, Occupational Choice, and Growth Cycles by Varvarigos, D. & Gil-Moltó, M.J.
 1
Endogenous Market Structure, Occupational Choice, 
and Growth Cycles¶ 
 
Dimitrios Varvarigos 
Department of Economics 
University of Leicester 
Telephone: ++44 (0) 116 252 2184 
Email: dv33@le.ac.uk 
 
Maria José Gil-Moltó 
Department of Economics 
University of Sheffield 
Telephone: +44 (0) 114 222 3416 
Email: m.j.gil-molto@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
                                                 
¶ For their useful comments and suggestions, we would like to thank Vincenzo Denicolò; seminar participants 
at the University of Leicester, the University of Exeter, and the University of Sheffield; and participants of the 
39th conference of the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics (Rome 2012), the 2013 
Growth and Policy conference in Durham, and the 13th conference of the Society for the Advancement of 
Economic Theory (Paris 2013), and the 2013 annual meeting of the Association of Southern European 
Economic Theorists (Bilbao). 
 2
 
 
 
Running Head: “Endogenous Market Structure and Cycles” 
 
 
Corresponding Author (please send proofs or any other communication to the 
following): 
 
Dr Dimitrios Varvarigos 
Department of Economics 
University of Leicester 
Astley Clarke Building 
University Road 
Leicester LE1 7RH 
United Kingdom 
 
Telephone: ++44 (0) 116 252 2184 
Email: dv33@le.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
Abstract 
We model an industry that supplies intermediate goods in a growing economy. Agents can 
choose whether to provide labour or to become firm owners and compete in the industry. 
The idea that entry is determined through occupational choice has major implications for the 
economy’s dynamics. Particularly, the results show that economic dynamics are governed by 
endogenous volatility in the determination of both the number of industry entrants and in 
the growth rate of output. Consequently, we argue that occupational choice and the 
structural characteristics of the endogenous market structure can act as both the impulse 
source and the propagation mechanism of economic fluctuations.     
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1   Introduction 
What are the fundamental sources behind economic fluctuations? The efforts to address this 
question have always been at the forefront of research in macroeconomics. Contrary to 
more conventional approaches that view exogenous (demand and/or supply) shocks as the 
initial impulse sources behind fluctuations in major economic variables, there is another 
strand of literature arguing that there is no reason to restrict attention to such exogenous 
processes as the generating causes of economic volatility.1 Instead, its impulse source may be 
embedded in the deep structural characteristics that shape the economy’s dynamics and may 
lead economic variables to display fluctuations, either through damped oscillations; or 
through periodic orbits that are of a more permanent nature; or through stochastic 
economic fluctuations generated by purely extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., sunspots) rather than 
shocks to such fundamentals as preferences or technologies. Analyses on this strand of 
literature include the papers by Grandmont (1985); Benhabib and Nishimura (1985); 
Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986); Reichlin (1986); Azariadis and Smith (1996); Grandmont et 
al. (1998); Matsuyama (1999); Banerji et al. (2004); and Kaas and Zink (2007) among others. 
Our paper seeks to contribute to this strand of literature by offering a theory that 
complements the existing ones in enriching our current understanding on the extent to 
which endogenous forces can be propagated and manifest themselves in economic cycles.  
                                                 
1 We refer to analyses that view economic fluctuations as only transitory or short-term phenomena, commonly 
known as ‘business cycles’. The main idea is that various exogenous shocks represent the initial impulse sources 
whose effect is propagated and manifested in fluctuations of major economic variables. Different strands of 
literature, such as the real business cycle and the new-Keynesian approaches, have debated on both the impulse 
sources and the propagation mechanisms that lead to economic fluctuations.    
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     We are motivated by an emerging literature of research papers that incorporate both 
endogenous entry and strategic interactions among firms, as a means of enriching the 
potential propagation mechanisms in fully-fledged dynamic general equilibrium models that 
include exogenous shocks.2 The papers by Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Etro and Colciago 
(2010), Colciago and Etro (2010) and Bilbiie et al. (2012) analyse and discuss the ability of 
such frameworks in capturing stylised facts of key economic variables over the cycle. We 
also incorporate an endogenous market structure, taking the form of an industry whose 
firms produce and supply intermediate goods in our dynamic model. Rather than analysing 
how this structure can propagate the initial impact of an exogenous shock however, we 
argue that the structural characteristics that determine the equilibrium dynamics of the 
industry act as both the impulse source and the propagation mechanism that generates 
fluctuations in output growth.3 In this respect, our analysis is conceptually closer to the work 
undertaken by Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005) who 
find that the dynamic equilibrium can converge to endogenous cycles, in models with 
imperfect competition and endogenous entry. In Chatterjee et al. (1993), a demand 
externality generates strategic complementarities in the decisions regarding market entry 
among different producers. As a result, the incentive of a potential entrant to create a firm 
and compete in the market is actually increasing in the existing number of firms, thus leading 
to multiple equilibria, as well as sunspots that are represented by a two-state Markov process. 
Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005) build a model where households/workers and 
potential entrepreneurs are distinct in the sense that are born with predetermined abilities 
                                                 
2 See Etro (2009) and the references therein for a more detailed discussion on this strand of literature.  
3 Other macroeconomic analyses that explicitly account for entry dynamics are, among others, those by Gil et 
al. (2013); Zeng (2013); and Sanders (2013).  
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that deters them from choosing a different occupation, apart from the one that nature 
dictates to the group that they belong to. The households’ labour supply is elastic while 
entrepreneurs face a fixed (exogenous) cost of entry in order to compete in the market of 
intermediate goods. The combination of these two factors affects the determination of the 
price mark-up whereas the latter impinges on the dynamics of capital accumulation. These 
dynamics generate indeterminacy, stochastic sunspot equilibria and deterministic cycles 
through Hopf bifurcations, even under circumstances that would rule out the existence such 
fluctuations in a perfectly competitive environment.             
     Similarly to these latter analyses, our model makes an explicit distinction between the 
different stages of an agent’s lifetime, made possible by the OLG setting that we employ. 
The reason why the equilibrium number of competitors in the industry varies over time is 
radically different however. In particular, the dynamics of the industry in our paper rest on 
the following structural characteristics. First and foremost, the number of agents that choose 
to become intermediate good producers and join the industry, rather than becoming workers 
in the final goods sector, is determined through an occupational choice process. In other 
words, agents are not born into distinct groups whose occupational possibilities are 
restricted. This is a significant departure whose empirical relevance is evident from 
arguments such as the one by Yu et al. (2009) who state that “the decision to open a business 
reflects lifetime comparisons of anticipated earnings from self-employment with wage or 
salaried employment” (Yu et al. 2009; page 3). In terms of our model, occupational choice 
replaces the more familiar zero profit condition with a condition according to which agents 
compare the utility associated with a particular choice of occupation. Consequently, the 
implied (utility) cost of market entry is not fixed; instead, it varies with both the pre-existing 
and the anticipated future number of competitive firms – an outcome that has significant 
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implications for the economy’s dynamics as it will transpire in the main part of our paper. 
Secondly, contrary to labour, intermediate good production requires some specific training 
that delays the agent’s entrance in the industry for the latter stage of her lifetime, thus 
allowing the number of market entrants to be effectively a state variable.     
     The combination of these characteristics in an OLG setting introduces rich dynamics 
with regards to the industry’s structure. Particularly, the industry displays endogenous volatility; 
that is, fluctuations in market entry are not governed by the presence of exogenous shocks. 
Instead, they are manifested in either damped oscillations, or sunspot equilibria, or limit 
cycles. Damped oscillations and sunspots occur when the steady state equilibrium is locally 
stable (a sink) but also locally indeterminate; the latter when the conditions for stability are 
not satisfied (the equilibrium is a saddle point) and the dynamics can display flip – or period 
doubling – bifurcations. These cyclical trajectories rest on the strong non-monotonicities 
that pervade the dynamics of the industry. Despite the fact that technological progress is 
exogenous and firms do not contribute to any productivity-enhancing R&D, these 
fluctuations generate endogenous cycles in the growth rate of output. These growth cycles 
are solely associated with the cyclical nature of entry and the corresponding variations in 
output that result from both the number of intermediate goods and the amount of labour. 
Again, growth cycles manifest themselves either through damped oscillations, or sunspots, 
or periodic orbits, depending on the corresponding dynamics for the intermediate goods 
industry – dynamics to which we alluded earlier.  
     Our premise that occupational choice is a significant element in the emergence of 
endogenously driven cycles in market entry is not a trivial issue. Realistically, people are not 
born with a predetermined career path; instead, their choice of occupation is one of the most 
important economic decisions that they make over their lifetime – a decision that, as we 
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argued previously, researchers view as fundamental in the process of business formation. 
Our argument is that the elements that affect this choice are important in generating 
fluctuations in entry and consequently economic activity. Indeed, if we remove occupational 
choice from our framework and assume instead that agents are born with predetermined 
employment possibilities, then endogenous fluctuations would be automatically ruled out. In 
terms of evidence, Koellinger and Thurik (2012) provide empirical support for this 
argument. They measure entrepreneurial activity as the share self-employed individuals and 
owners/managers of businesses in the total labour force – suggestive of a choice between 
entrepreneurial activity and paid labour – and find evidence that fluctuations in 
entrepreneurship appear to cause fluctuations in GDP per capita. Further empirical support 
on the link between occupational choice and economic fluctuations is discussed in Carrasco 
(1999) who finds evidence that entry into self-employment is pro-cyclical. This is another 
characteristic of our model, since the different age structure of the individuals engaged in 
alternative occupations allows a positive contemporaneous relation between output, the 
number of intermediate good firms (the ‘self-employed’ of our model) and the amount of 
labour, despite the trade-off associated with occupational choice. Pro-cyclical entry is also a 
characteristic in Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005) but 
the mechanisms and implications of our paper are much different.  
     At this point, we should emphasise that other papers have also identified the importance 
of occupational choice for economic outcomes. For example, Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
analyse its significance for the dynamics of income inequality and economic development. 
Rampini (2004) builds a model where different occupational opportunities vary in terms of 
both risk and return, and calibrates it in order to analyse the cyclical characteristics of 
entrepreneurial activities. Given the implications for indeterminacy, one of our results 
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echoes the main implications of the analysis by Mino et al. (2005). They also use an 
overlapping generations setting to show that occupational choice can be responsible for 
dynamic indeterminacy. However, there are notable differences between their setting and 
ours. Firstly, they do not endogenise the number of firms that operate in a particular sector; 
instead, they assume that both sectors in the economy (producing consumption and 
investment goods) are perfectly competitive. Secondly, the occupational choice entails a 
decision on whether to become a skilled worker or remain unskilled – with both types of 
labour being imperfect substitutes in production. Therefore, the aim and implications of our 
paper differ significantly. 
     All in all, our main message adds to the current understanding that stems from existing 
theories on endogenous market structures within dynamic general equilibirium set-ups, as 
well as existing theories on endogenous volatility. With respect to the former, we show that 
the endogenous determination of industry dynamics is not only a stronger propagation 
mechanism; it may also represent the actual impulse source of growth cycles. With respect to 
the latter, we show that the combination of occupational choice and endogenous market 
structure can represent yet another important explanatory factor in the emergence of 
recurrent cycles in economic activity. 
     Despite the fact that our endeavour is to present a theoretical framework that offers 
qualitative implications, rather than quantitative ones, it should be noted that our results are 
not alien to empirical facts. For example, the data seems to support the idea that business 
cycles are not just short-lived phenomena. On the contrary, existing work (e.g., Comin and 
Gertler 2006) has offered evidence showing that cycles are relevant to lower frequencies as 
well – an outcome that corroborates with our model’s OLG structure. Furthermore, there is 
evidence to suggest the existence of medium- and long-term oscillations in industrial activity 
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(e.g., Geroski 1995; Keklik 2003; Baker and Agapiou 2006) in addition to the more 
commonly observed short-term movements related to the incidence of business cycles – 
again, a fact which is in accordance with the main mechanism of our equilibrium results. 
     The remainder of our analysis is organised as follows. In Section 2 we lay down the basic 
set up of our economy. Section 3 derives the temporary equilibrium while Section 4 analyses 
and discusses the dynamic equilibrium and its implications. In Section 5 we conclude. 
                                
2   The Economic Environment  
Time is discrete and indexed by  0,1, 2, ...t . We consider an economy composed of a 
constant population of agents that belong to overlapping generations. Every period, a mass 
of 1n !  agents is born and each of them lives for two periods – youth and old age. During 
their youth, agents are endowed with a unit of time which they can devote (inelastically) to 
one of the two available occupational opportunities. One choice is to be employed by 
perfectly competitive firms who produce the economy’s final good. In this case, they receive 
the competitive salary tw  for their labour services. Alternatively, they can devote their unit of 
time to some educational activity that will equip them with the ability to use managerial 
effort and produce units of a specific variety j  of an intermediate good when they are old. 
Intermediate goods are used by the firms that produce and supply the final good. We assume 
that, once made, occupational choices are irreversible.  
     The lifetime utility function of an agent born in period by t  is given by   
 1, 1, 1,( ) ( ) ( )
t t Ƣ t Ƣ
j t j t j t ju c c ƸV e    , (1) 
where ,
t
t jc  denotes the consumption of final goods during youth, 1,
t
t jc  
denotes the 
consumption of final goods during old age and (0,1)Ƣ  is the relative weight attached to 
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the utility accrued from consumption during old age. Furthermore,
 1,t je  denotes effort and 
1,( )t jV e  is a continuous function that captures the disutility from effort and satisfies 
 (0) 0V
 
and
 
c ! 0V . The parameter Ƹ  is a binomial indicator that takes the value  0Ƹ
 
if 
the agent is a worker and  1Ƹ  if the agent is an intermediate good producer. As this 
notation is important for the clarity of the subsequent analysis, it is important to note that 
the time superscript indicates the period in which the agent is born whereas the time 
subscript indicates the period in which an activity actually occurs. The subscript j  will be 
applicable only for producers of intermediate inputs; thus, it will be later removed from 
variables that are relevant to workers. 
     We assume that the final good is the numéraire. The production of this good is 
undertaken by a large mass (normalised to one) of perfectly competitive firms. These firms 
combine labour from young agents, denoted tL , and all the available varieties of 
intermediate goods, each of them denoted ,t jx , to produce ty  units of output according to  
 
1 1 1
11
,
1
t
ơƨ
ƨN ƨ ơƨ ƨ
t t t t j t
j
y A N x L
  
 
ª º§ ·« » ¨ ¸« »© ¹« »¬ ¼
¦ , (2) 
where (0,1)ơ . The parameter ! 1ƨ  is the elasticity of substitution between different 
varieties of intermediate goods and tN  gives the number of these different varieties (see 
Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). 4 Therefore, the latter variable is the number of entrants operating in 
                                                 
4
 The scale factor 1/( 1)ƨtN
   implies that, in a symmetric equilibrium, 
/( 1)
1/( 1) ( 1)/
,
1
t
ƨ ƨ
N
ƨ ƨ ƨ
t t j t t
j
N x N x

  
 
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹¦ . 
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the oligopolistic industry at time t . The variable tA  denotes total factor productivity, which 
we assume to grow at a constant rate ! 0g  every period. Therefore,  
   0(1 )ttA g A , (3) 
where the initial value !0 0A  is given. Note that, given the timing of events, the initial 
period’s number of intermediate good firms is also exogenously given by 0 (1, )N n .    
     The production of intermediate goods takes place under Bertrand competition among 
producers. Each of them uses her managerial effort and produces units of an intermediate 
good according to  
 , ,t j t jx ƣe ,   ! 0ƣ . (4) 
Denoting the price of each intermediate good by ,t jp , the owner’s revenue is given by 
, ,t j t jp x . As we indicated above, the cost associated with the managerial activity is the 
effort/disutility cost characterised by the function ( )V .  
     The process according to which agents choose their occupation involves the comparison 
of the lifetime utility that corresponds to being either a worker or an intermediate good 
producer. This problem will be formally solved at a later stage in our analysis. Now we will 
identify the pattern of optimal consumption choices made by each agent, taking her 
occupational choice as given.  
     We shall assume that this is a small open economy in the sense that individuals can save 
or borrow funds at the fixed interest rate 0r ! .5 Furthermore, let us denote the present 
                                                 
5 The assumption of a small open economy implies that domestic borrowing and lending cannot affect the 
world interest rate r .  
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value of an agent’s lifetime income by ti . Given these, we can write her lifetime budget 
constraint as     
 
  
1,
,
1
t
t jt
t j t
c
c i
r
. (5) 
Substituting (5) in (1), we can calculate 
1,
0
t
j
t
t j
u
c 
w  w  in order to derive 
 1, (1 )
t
t j ic Ƣ r i   , (6) 
i.e., the demand for consumption goods during old age. Combining (6) and (5), we can 
derive the corresponding demand function for goods consumed during youth. This is given 
by  
 , (1 )
t
t j tc Ƣ i  .  (7) 
As expected, an individual’s consumption expenditures during each period are proportional 
to her lifetime income (in present value terms). The relative utility weight Ƣ  is crucial in 
determining what proportion of lifetime income will be devoted to the satisfaction of 
consumption needs in either youth or old age.  
     Now, let us consider each group of agents separately, beginning with the workers for 
whom the lifetime income corresponds to the one accruing from their labour services, i.e., 
t ti w . Given the previous discussion and results, for those young agents whose choice is to 
provide labour we have  0Ƹ , ,worker (1 )tt tc Ƣ w   and ,worker1 (1 )tt tc Ƣ r w   , meaning that each 
worker saves an amount t ts Ƣw  during her youth. Therefore, we can use (1) to write the 
lifetime utility of a worker born in period t  as    
 ,workert tu Ʀw , (8) 
where Ʀ  is a composite parameter term given by 
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 (1 )(1 ) (1 )Ƣ Ƣ ƢƦ Ƣ Ƣ r{   .  (9) 
     For intermediate good producers, however, the equilibrium characteristics are different. 
Particularly, their lifetime income (in present value terms) equals 
1, 1,
1
t j t j
t
p x
i
r
   . Therefore, 
those who decide to be intermediate good producers have  1Ƹ , 
1, 1,,producer
, (1 )
1
t j t jt
t j
p x
c Ƣ
r
     and 
,producer
1, 1, 1,
t
t j t j t jc Ƣp x   , meaning that each of them borrows 
the amount 
1, 1,
, (1 )
1
t j t j
t j
p x
b Ƣ
r
     during her youth.
6 Using these results in (1), we get the 
lifetime utility of a producer born in period t  as    
 ,producer 1, 1, 1,( )
t
j t j t j t ju zp x V e    , (10) 
where z  is a composite parameter term given by 
 (1 ) 1(1 ) (1 )Ƣ Ƣ Ƣz Ƣ Ƣ r {   .  (11) 
     With this discussion we have completed the basic set up of our economy. In the sections 
that follow we derive the economy’s temporary and dynamic equilibrium, with particular 
emphasis on the dynamics of the intermediate goods industry. 
  
3   Temporary Equilibrium  
For the producers of final goods, profit maximisation implies that each input earns its 
marginal product. In terms of labour income, we have  
                                                 
6 Note that the implied cost of the activity that equipes an agent with the ability to become an intermediate 
good producer, corresponds to the foregone labour income. We could have allowed an additional direct cost, 
taking the form of a proportion of (the present value of) her second period earnings. This would have 
introduced an additional scale factor to the model, without altering our results.  
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1 1 1
1
,
1
(1 ) (1 )
t
ơƨ
ƨN ƨ ơ tƨ ƨ
t t t t j t
j t
y
w ơ A N x L ơ
L
  
 
ª º§ ·« »   ¨ ¸« »© ¹« »¬ ¼
¦ . (12) 
For intermediate goods we have  
 
1
1
1 1 11 1 1
1 1
, , , ,
1 1
t t
ơƨ ƨ
ơ ƨ ƨ ƨN Nƨ ƨơ ƨ ƨ ƨ ƨ
t j t t t t j t j t j
j j
p A L ơN x x x

     
  
ª º§ · § ·« » ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸« »© ¹ © ¹« »¬ ¼
¦ ¦ . (13) 
Multiplying both sides of (13) by ,t jx  and summing over all j ’s, we can get  
 
1 1 1
11
, , ,
1 1
t t
ơƨ
ƨN N ƨ ơƨ ƨ
t j t j t t t j t
j j
p x ơA N x L
  
  
ª º§ ·« » ¨ ¸« »© ¹« »¬ ¼
¦ ¦ . (14) 
We can combine Equations (13) and (14) and exercise some straightforward, but tedious, 
algebra to derive the demand function for an intermediate good. This is given by  
 
,
,
ƨ
t j t
t j
t t
p X
x
P N
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹
,  (15) 
where  
 
1 1 1
1
,
1
t
ƨ
ƨN ƨ
ƨ ƨ
t t t j
j
X N x
  
 
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (16) 
Furthermore, using , ,
1
tN
t j t j t t
j
p x P X
 
 ¦ , the price index is given by  
 
1
1
1
,
1
1 tN ƨƨ
t t j
jt
P p
N

 
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹¦ . (17) 
     The result in (15) is nothing else than the familiar inverse demand function in models 
with a constant elasticity of substitution between different varieties of goods (Dixit and 
Stiglitz 1977). In other words, the share of product j  in the overall demand for intermediate 
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inputs is inversely related to its relative price. This effect is more pronounced with higher 
values of ƨ , i.e., if different varieties are less heterogeneous, thus more easily substitutable.  
     Now let us consider the equilibrium in the labour, the financial and the final goods 
markets. With respect to the former, the demand for labour by firms ( tL ) must be equal to 
the supply of labour by young agents. Recall that in period t , out of the total population 
mass of n , some agents will decide to set up firms and produce intermediate goods in period 
1t  . The number of these agents is 1tN  . Therefore, the labour market equilibrium is  
 1t tL n N   . (18) 
     As for the financial market, let us define aggregate debt (denoted td ) as the difference 
between borrowing and saving, i.e.,  
 
1
,
1
tN
t t j t t
j
d b L s

 
 ¦ . (19) 
Naturally, debt evolves according to 
 1(1 )t t t td r d C y    ,  (20) 
where tC  is the aggregate consumption expenditure in period t .
7 Furthermore, using the 
expressions in (2), (12) and (14) it becomes clear that the constant returns technology implies 
that  
 , ,
1
tN
t t t t j t j
j
y L w p x
 
 ¦ .  (21) 
Combining (19)-(21), we can write Equation (20) as 
                                                 
7 Note that aggregate debt can be negative, in which case Equation (20) is the accumulation of assets in the 
economy. 
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1
, 1, 1 1 , ,
1 1 1
(1 )
t t tN N N
t j t t t j t t t t t t j t j
j j j
b L s r b L s C L w p x

  
   
§ ·       ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦   
 
1
, , , 1, 1 1
1 1 1
( ) (1 ) (1 )
t t tN N N
t j t t t t j t j t j t t t
j j j
b L w s p x r b L r s C

  
   
ª º        « »¬ ¼¦ ¦ ¦ .  (22) 
We can use previous results to rewrite Equation (22) as  
 
1
,producer ,worker 1,producer 1,worker
, , 1
1 1
t tN N
t t t t
t j t t t j t t t
j j
c L c c L c C
  

  
    ¦ ¦ ,  (23) 
an expression that corresponds to the equilibrium in the goods market.   
     Now, we can use , ,
1
tN
t j t j t t
j
p x P X
 
 ¦ , (12), (17) and (21) in (15) to write the demand 
function for the intermediate good as  
 
,
,
1
,
1
t
ƨ
t j
t j tN
ƨ
t j
j
p
x ơy
p


 
 
¦
.  (24) 
The result in (24) is more explicit on the interactions in the pricing decisions made by 
competing firms. It can be used to solve the utility maximisation problem of an agent who 
produces intermediate goods. To this purpose, it will be useful to specify a functional form 
for the effort cost component 1,( )t jV e  . For this reason, and to ensure analytical tractability, 
we specify   
 1, 1,( )t j t jV e me  ,   0m ! .  (25) 
Writing Equation (24) in terms of period 1t   and substituting it together with (4) and (25) 
in (10), allows us to write the utility function of the producer j  as  
 
1
1,,producer
1, 1
1
1,
1
t
ƨ
t jt
j t j tN
ƨ
t j
j
pm
u zp ơyƣ
p



 


 
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹¦
. (26) 
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Given that firm owners operate under Bertrand competition, their objective is to choose the 
price of their products in order to maximise their lifetime utility. In other words, their 
objective is  
 
1
1,
1,
1, 1
1
1,
1
max
t
t j
ƨ
t j
t j tN
p ƨ
t j
j
pm
zp ơyƣ
p



 


 
­ ½° °§ ·° °® ¾¨ ¸© ¹° °° °¯ ¿¦
. (27) 
     After some straightforward algebra, it can be shown that the solution to this problem 
leads to a symmetric equilibrium for which  
 1, 1 1, 1and    t j t t j tp p x x j      , (28) 
where the optimal price equals  
 11
1
[ ( 1) 1]
= .
( 1)( 1)
t
t
t
ƨ Nm
p ƣz ƨ N



 
   (29) 
In addition, given (17) and (22), the equilibrium quantity of the intermediate good by each 
entrepreneur is  
 1 11
1 1
( 1)( 1)
=
[ ( 1) 1]
t t
t
t t
ơy ƨ Nƣz
x
N m ƨ N
 

 
 
  . (30) 
     The result in Equation (30) resembles the familiar condition according to which the price 
is set as a mark-up over the marginal cost of production. In this case, each producer sets a 
mark-up over the marginal utility cost of producing the intermediate good, since one unit of 
production requires a utility cost of /m ƣ  units of effort. Naturally, the mark-up is 
decreasing in the number of producers because the latter implies a more intensely 
competitive environment. Additionally, the mark-up is also decreasing in ƨ  because higher 
values of this parameter increase the degree of substitutability between different varieties of 
intermediate goods – yet another structural characteristic that enhances the degree of 
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competition. From Equation (30), we can see that the inverse demand function implies that 
the components that reduce the relative price of the input increase its share on aggregate 
demand.     
     The solutions above allow us to rewrite the utility of an intermediate good producer, after 
substituting (28) and (29) in (26), as follows:  
 ,producer 1
1
=
( 1) 1
t t
t
zơy
u ƨ N

  
. (31) 
With this result at hand, we can now turn our attention to the occupational choice problem 
of an agent who is young in period t .  
 
3.1   Occupational Choice  
Our purpose in this section is to determine how many agents will decide to become suppliers 
of intermediate inputs. Obviously, the equilibrium condition requires that an agent born in t  
should be indifferent between the two different occupational opportunities. Formally, a 
condition that needs to hold in equilibrium is  
 ,producer ,worker=t tu u , (32) 
or, after utilising (8), (12) and (31),  
 1
1
(1 )
=
( 1) 1
t t
t t
zơy Ʀ ơ y
ƨ N L



  . (33)   
     We can manipulate algebraically the expression in (33) even further. First, we can use the 
symmetry condition (Eq. 28) in (2) to get  
 1( )ơ ơt t t t ty A N x L
 . (34)   
Next, we can use (30) to get  
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 11 1 1
1
( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1)
= =
[ ( 1) 1] [ ( 1) 1]
t t
t t t t t t
t t
ƨ N ƨ Nƣz ƣz
N x ơy N x ơy
m ƨ N m ƨ N

  

       . (35) 
Further substitution of (35) in (34) allows us to write  
 
1 1
1
( 1)( 1)
[ ( 1) 1]
ơ
ơ
tơ
t t t
t
ƨ Nơƣz
y A L
m ƨ N

 ­ ½  ® ¾ ¯ ¿
. (36)   
Finally, we can use (18) and (36) in (26), and rearrange to get  
 
/(1 )
2 1
1/(1 )
1 1
[ ( 1) 1] ( 1)(1 )(1 )
( 1) 1 (1 ) ( 1) [ ( 1) 1]
ơ ơ
E
t t t
ơ
t t t
n N ƨ N Nơ r
ƨ N ơ g N ƨ N

 

 
­ ½     ® ¾     ¯ ¿
, (37)   
where 11 t
t
A
g
A
   is derived by alluding to (3). Note that the superscript in 2EtN   denotes 
the expectation formed on this variable. 
     The result in Equation (37) is the most important in our set-up. It implies that the 
determination of the equilibrium number of firms in the intermediate goods industry is not a 
static one. Instead, there will be some transitional dynamics as the number of producers 
converges to its long-run equilibrium. Particularly, we can see that the equilibrium number of 
firms in any given period depends on both the predetermined number of firms from the 
previous period and the expectation on the number of firms that will be active during the 
next period. Note that the endogenous occupational choice is critical for these dynamics. It 
is exactly because of this choice that the determination of 1tN  is related to the previous 
period’s demand conditions (and thus tN ) and the next period’s labour market equilibrium 
(therefore 2
E
tN  ).  
     The intuition for these effects is as follows. If the existing number of intermediate good 
firms is large, then the overall amount of intermediate goods, and therefore the marginal 
product of labour, will be higher. This increases the equilibrium wage and thus the relative 
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benefit from the utility of being a worker when young, rather than setting up a firm when 
old.8 Now suppose that, while forming their occupational choice, the current young expect 
that the future number of firms in the intermediate goods industry will be high. For them, 
this implies that the amount of labour, and therefore total demand in the next period will be 
relatively low. Thus, the relative utility benefit of being a firm owner when old, rather than a 
worker when young, is reduced because the expectation of lower future demand for final 
goods will have corresponding repercussions in terms of reduced future demand for 
intermediate goods as well. Consequently, a reduced number of individuals out of the 
current young will opt for the choice of becoming intermediate good producers.  
 
4   Dynamic Equilibrium  
The remainder of our analysis will focus on the dynamics of the industry that produces 
intermediate goods. In what follows, we consider the economy’s perfect foresight dynamics, 
i.e., equilibrium trajectories that satisfy 2 2
E
t tN N  .  
 
4.1   The Steady State  
We can obtain the stationary equilibrium for the number of intermediate good firms, after 
substituting 2 2
E
t tN N   in (37) and using the steady state condition 
2 1
ˆ
t t tN N N N    . This procedure will eventually allow us to derive 
 
                                                 
8 According to Parker (2009), this ‘wage-effect’ is an empirically important determinant when individuals 
choose whether to open a business or seek paid employment.    
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Proposition 1. Suppose 1n Ƥ!   where 1/(1 )(1 )(1 )/ (1 ) ơƤ ơ r ơ g     . Then there exists a unique 
steady state equilibrium ˆ (1, )N n  such that  
 
1/(1 )
1/(1 )
( 1)(1 )(1 )/ (1 )ˆ
1 (1 )(1 )/ (1 )
ơ
ơ
n ƨ ơ r ơ g
N ƨ ơ r ơ g


         . (38)   
  
     As long as the steady state solution is asymptotically stable, then for any predetermined 
0 (1, )N n  the equilibrium number of producers will eventually converge to Nˆ  in the long-
run. Later, we are going to formally characterise the conditions for the (local) stability of this 
equilibrium. For now, it is instructive to undertake some comparative statics to identify the 
effects of the economy’s structural parameters on the steady state number of firms 
competing in the intermediate goods industry. This is a task that can be easily undertaken 
through the use of Equation (38). The results can be summarised in  
 
Proposition 2. The long-run equilibrium number of firms in the intermediate goods industry is: 
i. Increasing in the growth rate of total factor productivity ( )g ; 
ii. Decreasing in the relative share of labour income (1 )ơ , the world interest rate ( )r , and the degree 
of substitutability between different varieties of intermediate products ( )ƨ . 
 
     The economic interpretation for these results is as follows. A permanent increase in the 
growth rate causes future demand to become even higher compared to current demand 
because of the increase of the economy’s resources. This effect boosts the relative utility 
benefit of becoming a firm owner, with corresponding implications for the occupational 
choices made by young agents. An increase in the relative share of labour income will 
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motivate more agents to work for final goods firms, as the income earned from activities in 
the intermediate goods industry becomes relatively low. The utility benefit of such activities 
is also impeded in an industry where goods are less heterogeneous. Finally, when individuals 
face a higher borrowing rate, then they have a lower incentive to opt for the occupation 
which renders borrowing necessary in order to finance the first period’s consumption needs 
– in this case, firm ownership.   
 
4.2   Transitional Dynamics  
Let us use 2 2
E
t tN N   in (37) and solve the resulting expression for 2tN  . Eventually, we 
get  
 
/(1 )
1/(1 )
1
2 11/(1 ) /(1 )
1
[ ( 1) 1] 1(1 )(1 )
( , )
(1 ) ( 1) ( 1) 1
ơ ơơ
t t
t t tơ ơ ơ
t t
ƨ N Nơ r
N n F N Nơ g N ƨ N


  

ª º      « »   ¬ ¼
. (39)   
As we can see, the dynamics of the intermediate goods industry are characterised by a non-
linear, second-order difference equation in terms of the industry’s size (i.e., the number of 
agents who compete in the industry).   
     One way to analyse the transition equation in (39) is to define 1t tZ N   and treat the 
dynamics as being generated by the following system of first-order difference equations:  
 
/(1 )
1/(1 )
1 /(1 )
[ ( 1) 1] 1
( , )
( 1) ( 1) 1
ơ ơơ
t t
t t t ơ ơ
t t
ƨ Z N
Z F Z N n Ƥ
Z ƨ N

 
ª º     « »  ¬ ¼
, (40)   
 1 ( , )t t t tN H Z N Z   , (41)   
where 0 0, (1, )N Z n  are taken as the initial conditions and the steady state satisfies ˆ ˆZ N  
and Ƥ  is defined in Proposition 1. The Jacobian matrix associated with the planar system of 
Equations (40)-(41) is  
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
t t
t t
Z N
Z N
F Z N F Z N
H Z N H Z N
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
,  
where ˆ ˆN Z  is given in (38). Furthermore, the eigenvalues are the roots of the polynomial 
2ƫ Tƫ D  , i.e.,  
 
2 2
1 2
4 4
 and 
2 2
T T D T T Dƫ ƫ     ,  
where  
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
t tZ N
T F Z N H Z N  ,  
and  
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
t t t tZ N N Z
D F Z N H Z N F Z N H Z N  ,  
are respectively the trace and the determinant of the matrix. As it is well known (Azariadis 
1993; Galor 2007) the eigenvalues can be used to check the stability of the steady state 
solution and to trace the transitional dynamics towards it. Later, it will transpire that, under 
different conditions, Nˆ  can be either (locally) stable or unstable. For now, we will focus our 
attention to a case whereby the steady state equilibrium characterised by (38) is actually 
stable, while the possible implications that arise in the scenario where Nˆ  is unstable will be 
discussed subsequently.  
     Let us begin by defining 
(1 ) 2Ə( )
1 1
Ƥơ ƤƨƤ Ƥ ơ Ƥƨ
{     and Ƥ
  such that Ə( ) 1Ƥ n  . 
Furthermore, the analysis that follows will be making use of the following assumptions:  
 
Assumption 1. 
3
1 2 1
1
ơ
n ơ
§ ·!  ¨ ¸© ¹ , 
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Assumption 2. 2Ƥƨ d . 
 
Both assumptions are employed to make the analysis of the transitional dynamics more 
precise, clear and sharply focused. Firstly, Assumption 2 is sufficient to guarantee that, at 
least for some range of parameter values, the steady state equilibrium will be stable. 
Secondly, we want to focus solely on the emergence of flip (period doubling) bifurcations. In 
this respect, Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the eigenvalues of the dynamical 
system in (40)-(41) are real numbers. Finally, we wish to note that the proofs to the 
subsequent results are relegated to the Appendix. 
     The sufficient conditions for stability are formally described in  
 
Lemma 1. If either (i) 1Ƥƨ d  or (ii) (1, 2]Ƥƨ  and Ƥ Ƥ  , then the steady state solution Nˆ  is locally 
stable. In other words, the dynamics starting from an initial value 0 (1, )N n  will eventually converge to 
Nˆ .    
  
     With respect to output, once the industry converges to its steady state, the production of 
final goods will converge to a balanced growth path. Along this path, output will grow at a 
constant rate that is proportional to the growth rate of total factor productivity. It is 
straightforward to use Equations (18) and (36) and the result of Lemma 1 to establish that  
 
1
1 1lim 1 (1 ) 1.t ơ
t
t
y
g
y
 
of
§ ·   ¨ ¸© ¹
 (42)   
     Nevertheless, during the transition to the balanced growth path, the dynamics of output 
will also be (partially) dictated by the transitional dynamics of the intermediate goods 
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industry. A technical condition that can facilitate a better understanding of how the 
intermediate goods industry evolves over time is given by  
 
Lemma 2. As long as the conditions for stability that are summarised in Lemma 1 hold, both eigenvalues 
are negative , i.e., 1 2, ( 1, 0)ƫ ƫ   .    
   
Using Lemma 2 we can characterise the transitional behaviour of the economy through  
 
Proposition 3. Given Lemma 2, the number of firms in the intermediate goods industry converges to its 
long-term equilibrium through cycles. Consequently, output growth displays fluctuations as it converges to the 
balanced growth path. 
 
     Recall that the number of producers in any given period is affected by both the 
predetermined number of producers from the previous period and the expectation on the 
number of producers that will be active in the future. The manner and direction of these 
effects, both discussed at an earlier point of our analysis, render the result of Proposition 3 
to be a quite intuitive one. For example, consider a situation where the existing number of 
intermediate good producers is low relative to the steady state. For the current young agents, 
the incentive to opt for market entry when old is enhanced because the marginal product of 
labour (and therefore the wage) is currently low. As a result, an increased fraction of the 
current young will choose to become firm owners and compete in the intermediate goods 
industry when they become old. However, for this to happen they also need to expect that, 
next period, a lower fraction of the future generation’s agents will decide to become 
producers because this will increase labour, and therefore aggregate demand during the 
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period where producers will reap the benefits of their activity. The mechanism that we 
described previously does verify this expectation, hence granting an even greater incentive to 
the agents for setting up intermediate good firms. Furthermore, it explains why both the size 
of the intermediate goods industry and output growth converge to their long-run equilibrium 
through cycles.    
     For illustrative purposes, in what follows we will analyse the transition equation in (39) 
numerically, making sure to choose parameter values that render the solution in (38) stable, 
hence a meaningful one. We should emphasise, however, that we undertake these numerical 
simulations solely as a means to illustrate the transitional behaviour of the economy. The 
focus of our analysis is still purely qualitative, hence it is neither our intention nor do we 
claim any attempt to offer a quantitative match of key moments from stylised facts.    
     For the baseline parameter values, we choose 0.5ơ  , 0.32g  , 0.3r   and 1.3ƨ  , 
while the total population is set to 100n  .9 The initial values are 0 15N   and 1 85N    – 
recalling that 1N  corresponds to 0Z  in (41). In Figure 1 we see the transitional dynamics for 
the intermediate goods industry, based on this simulation. Given the numerical example, the 
steady state value for Nˆ  is roughly 51 (50.8764 to be precise) and the industry converges to 
this equilibrium. Nevertheless, this convergence is clearly non-monotonic. Instead, 
convergence takes place through damped oscillations, or cycles, during which the number of 
firms takes values above and below the stationary value as the industry approaches towards 
it. In Figure 2 we use the same baseline parameter values, in addition to 0 10A  , to simulate 
                                                 
9 It can be easily established that these parameter values lie on the permissible range that guarantees stability 
according to Lemma 1.      
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the movements of the growth rate of output, 1 1t
t
y
y
  . Again, we can see that, due to 
fluctuations that occupational choice generates in the determination of the number of 
producers each period, output converges to its balanced growth path (with a growth rate of 
0.7424) through cycles. Note however that these fluctuations are not due to the fact that the 
intermediate goods industry is associated with some type of R&D that increases the rate of 
technological progress endogenously. Instead, they are purely associated with variations in 
output that result from the cyclical nature of tN  and the corresponding variations in both 
the number of intermediate goods and the labour input. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 
4.3   Indeterminacy and Sunspot Equilibria  
Before we proceed to the analysis of limit cycles, we will discuss the possibility of 
indeterminacy in the transitional dynamics of the economy. As we have seen from the 
second order transition equation in (39), or the equivalent dynamical system in (40)-(41), the 
transitional dynamics are traced after we consider two initial values 0N  and 0Z  – the latter 
corresponding to 1N . Nevertheless, while 0N  is indeed predetermined, this is not the case 
for 1N . Instead, taking the value of 0N  as given, 1N  reflects an equilibrium formed on an 
expectation about 2N  and so on. In other words, the stability of the steady state equilibrium 
Nˆ  implies that, for the same 0 (1, )N n , there are certainly more than one trajectories that 
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are consistent with the economy’s convergence to the steady state. In other words, 
economies that are identical both in terms of structural parameters and predetermined 
conditions may display very different equilibrium characteristics for a large part of their 
transition towards the common steady state. 
      Nevertheless, the aforementioned arguments – indicative of local indeterminacy – have 
more implications for the evolution of output. Particularly, the self-fulfilling nature of one of 
the mechanisms that permeates occupational choice implies that, in addition to the stationary 
equilibrium derived in (38), the economy’s dynamics may also be characterised by stochastic 
cycles due to sunspots. These cycles are not driven by shocks to any of the model’s 
fundamental parameters of preferences or technologies. Instead, they manifest the element 
of extrinsic uncertainty inherent to the fact that individuals choose their occupation (labour 
or intermediate goods production), partially based on an expectation about future outcomes. 
Their choice however is by itself conducive to the actual realisation of those outcomes. 
Indeed, previously we indicated that the incentive of agents to earn their lifetime income 
through intermediate goods production is increased when they expect that market entry will 
be reduced in the period afterwards. Due to the fact that current market entry is inversely 
related to the predetermined number of firms, these expectations can become self-fulfilling. 
If more agents join the industry now, then the future market entry will actually be relatively 
low, thus verifying their initial expectation. We can summarise these implication through 
 
Proposition 4. As long as the conditions for stability that are summarised in Lemma 1 hold, then there 
exist sunspot equilibria in the neighbourhood of the stationary solution Nˆ .  
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     A formal proof for the previous result appears in Woodford (1986) and Grandmont et al. 
(1998) – the former for the case of a second-order scalar system with only one 
predetermined value and the latter for a planar system of two state variables in which only 
one of them is predetermined. The existence of sunspots represents one type of permanent 
economic fluctuations in our model. In the subsequent section, we show that there may also 
be another type of fluctuations – in that case, not stochastic but deterministic – which occur 
as a result of period doubling bifurcations that result in oscillations, similar to the ones 
identified in Proposition 3, but at the same time rather different in the sense that these 
oscillations will be permanent.          
 
4.4   Periodic Equilibrium  
So far, we have seen scenarios in which oscillations in economic variables are not permanent 
– an outcome related to our restriction on conditions that guarantee the stability of the 
steady state. Nevertheless, it will also be interesting to examine the possibilities that arise 
when the steady state in (38) does not satisfy these stability conditions. This may happen in 
circumstances that are described in  
 
Lemma 3. Suppose that (1, 2]Ƥƨ  and Ƥ Ƥ!  . In this case, the two eigenvalues 1ƫ  and 2ƫ  satisfy 
2 10 1ƫ ƫ! !  ! . Therefore, the steady state solution Nˆ  is a saddle point.    
  
     The saddle point property of the steady state implies that, for given 0N , there is only one 
corresponding 1 0( )N Z  such that the industry dynamics follow a path of convergence 
towards ˆ ˆ( )N Z . All other paths will diverge away from this point. Now, recall that the 
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dynamics are traced after we consider two initial values 0N  and 1 0( )N Z  from which only 
0N  is predetermined. This implies that we can rule out some divergent paths because they 
are clearly not optimal:  as tN  will at some point approach either 1 or n , output and 
consumption will become equal to zero. Nevertheless, there are paths that although not 
converging towards Nˆ , there is no reason why they should be ruled out. These paths entail 
the presence of a periodic equilibrium or limit cycles. We will use the previous numerical 
example to illustrate such cases, bearing in mind that parameter values must satisfy the 
conditions summarised in Lemma 3.  
     In the baseline numerical example, we set the TFP growth factor equal to 0.26g  . 
Doing so, the simulation indicates that the steady state Nˆ  falls to roughly 49 (the exact 
number is 48.55687), but this is an unstable solution. Instead, the dynamics of entry 
converge to a 2-period cycle equal to 1 2{ , }N N  {83.02957452, 15.51242096} that 
corresponds to a 2-period cycle for the growth rate {0.656219559, 0.521823448}. This 
periodic equilibrium is in fact robust to changes in the initial conditions – an outcome that, 
together with the fact that they surround a unique but unstable solution, indicates that the 2-
period cycle is stable. Cycles with two periodic solutions appear as we reduce g  even 
further, until at some point we observe that 2-period cycles become unstable and replaced by 
the emergence of a stable 4-period cycle. For example, setting 0.205g   leads to an unstable 
steady state ˆ 46.33716N   and a 4-period cycle 1 2 3 4{ , , , }N N N N  {89.6690622, 
4.97178912, 93.46991857, 8.330862453} that corresponds to a 4-period cycle for the growth 
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rate {0.590587824, 0.226986784, 0.718944528, 0.325064367}.10 Reducing g  even more leads 
to the emergence of cycles of period-8 (e.g., for 0.199g  ), period-16 (e.g., for 0.1983g  ) 
and so on, suggesting that the economy’s dynamics undergo a “period-doubling route to 
chaos” (Devaney 2003). Indeed, reducing the TFP growth factor to 0.185 generates cycles 
that are clearly aperiodic. Figure 3 provides the simulated graphs for all the examples that we 
offered above.  
     It is possible to generalise the implications offered by these numerical examples. We can 
start with 
 
Lemma 4. Suppose that (1, 2]Ƥƨ . The dynamical system of (40) and (41) undergoes a flip (period 
doubling) bifurcation at Ƥ Ƥ  . Hence, there exist stable limit cycles. 
 
Given this, we can characterise the dynamics in this case through   
 
Proposition 5. Under the conditions in Lemmas 3 and 4, fluctuations in the number of intermediate good 
firms can become permanent. Therefore, output may not converge to its balanced growth path; instead it will 
fluctuate permanently around it.      
                        
     Recall that Ƥ  is a composite parameter term that is negatively related to g . Given Lemma 
4, it is not difficult to understand why our previous simulations revealed that reductions of 
the TFP growth factor generate period doubling bifurcations. In terms of intuition, we can 
                                                 
10 In these examples, we have ignored the discrete nature of tN . The reader may approximate the appropriate 
value by using the closest integer.    
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allude to the forces of industry dynamics that we described previously. Now however, the 
impact of non-monotonicities is strong enough so that cycles do not dissipate over time. On 
the contrary, they become a permanent characteristic of the industry’s dynamics and 
consequently, the evolution of output. These fluctuations do not rest on any exogenous 
shocks. Instead, both the impulse source and the propagation mechanism lie with the 
structural characteristics of the economic environment. In particular, the occupational choice 
is the source of non-monotonicities that generate fluctuations and propagate them into 
fluctuations of output growth.       
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
5   Conclusion 
In this paper, our endeavour was to contribute to the emerging body of literature that studies 
the dynamic behaviour of endogenous market structures in dynamic general equilibrium 
models. We showed that an overlapping generations setting, combined with the idea that 
entry decisions are made through an occupational choice process, can lead to interesting 
implications concerning these dynamic patterns. We showed that the intrinsic dynamics of 
the industry can lead to fluctuations, either though damped oscillations, stochastic sunspot 
equilibria, or limit cycles.  These results represent yet another example on how endogenous 
forces can cause fluctuations in economic dynamics.    
     A note of caution merits discussion here, given the fact that that our paper’s dynamics are 
characterised by periodic orbits that may resemble the type of fluctuations we observe in the 
data. We believe that a better interpretation of our results should entail a correspondence to 
low frequency waves in industry activity, such as those presented by Comin and Gertler 
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(2006) for example, rather than the high frequency fluctuations that are more suitably 
attributed to the occurrence of short-term business cycles. For this reason, we need to clarify 
that our analysis in under no circumstances an attempt to invalidate other explanations for 
the cyclicality of economic dynamics, based on the idea of exogenous shocks – explanations 
that we actually view as being indubitably important. The main message form our work is 
that the (medium-term) cyclical behaviour of economies, in addition to being a response to 
changing economic conditions, may also reflect characteristics that render them inherently 
volatile. As we indicated at the very beginning of this paper, other authors have asserted the 
same through their research work, thus offering some momentum to this idea.  
     The model we presented is simple enough to guarantee a clear understanding of the 
mechanisms that are involved in the emergence of the basic results, without blurring either 
their transparency or their intuition. Of course, there is certainly a large scope for getting 
additional implications by modifying or enriching some of the model’s founding 
characteristics. One obvious direction is to assume that the oligopolistic industry supplies 
firms with different varieties of capital goods while, at the same time, retaining the important 
characteristic of endogenous occupational choice. The ensuing process of capital 
accumulation could set in motion some very interesting implications concerning economic 
dynamics. Another potential direction is to endogenise the exit rate, perhaps by assuming 
that firm ownership is bequeathed from parents to children.  Again, such a set-up could 
initiate even richer dynamics, thus it offers a potentially fruitful avenue for future research 
work.    
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Figures (please place the corresponding Figure to the 
place indicated on the main text) 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 10 20 30 40 50
N(t)
 
Figure 1. Damped oscillations in market entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
1 21 41
GrowthRate
 
Figure 2. Damped oscillations in output growth 
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Figure 3. Permanent deterministic cycles 
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Appendix 
 
Proofs of Lemmas 1-4 
The Jacobian matrix associated with the planar system in (40)-(41) is  
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
t t
t t
Z N
Z N
F Z N F Z N
H Z N H Z N
§ ·¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
,  
where ˆ ˆN Z  is given in (38). Some straightforward algebra with the use of Equations (38), 
(40) and (41), reveals that the trace (T ) and the determinant ( D ) are equal to  
 
(1 )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
(1 )[ (1 )]t t
Z N
ơ Ƥƨ
T F Z N H Z N Ƥ ƨ ơ n Ƥ
­ ½    ® ¾  ¯ ¿
, (A1) 
and  
 
(1 )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
(1 )[ (1 )]t t t t
Z N N Z
Ƥơ Ƥƨ
D F Z N H Z N F Z N H Z N ơ n Ƥ
      , (A2) 
respectively. Furthermore, the eigenvalues are the roots of the polynomial 2ƫ Tƫ D  , i.e.,  
 
2 2
1 2
4 4
 and 
2 2
T T D T T Dƫ ƫ     .  (A3) 
To ensure the stability of the steady state, we want the eigenvalues to satisfy 1 1ƫ   and 
2 1ƫ  . Given that 1 2ƫ ƫ T   and 1 2ƫ ƫ D , two necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for stability are 1 1D    and 2 2T   . Evidently, the determinant is positive by virtue 
of (A2); therefore we can use (A2) to find that 1D   corresponds to the restriction  
 
(1 )
1
1
Ƥơ Ƥƨ
n Ƥ ơ
 !   . (A4) 
Furthermore, note that we can use (A1) and (A2) to get  
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 T D Ƥƨ  . (A5) 
As we constrain ourselves to 1D  , Equation (A5) reveals that 2T  . Therefore, we want 
to obtain a restriction for which 2T !  . Using (A5), it can be very easily established that a 
sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this is given by  
 2Ƥƨ  . (A6) 
In addition to the above, we will rule out complex eigenvalues by imposing the parameter 
restriction that ensures 2 4 0T D t . Specifically,  
 2 4T Dt    
 2( ) 4D Ƥƨ D t    
 2 22(2 ) ( ) 0D Ƥƨ D Ƥƨ   t    
 Ɩ( ) 0D t . (A7) 
It is 2Ɩ(0) ( ) 0Ƥƨ !  and 2Ɩ(1) 1 2(2 ) ( ) 0Ƥƨ Ƥƨ      by virtue of (A6). Furthermore, 
Ɩ 2 2(2 ) 0D Ƥƨc      for (0,1)D . Hence, for 2 4 0T D t  to hold we need the 
restriction minD D  , where minD  is the lowest-valued root of Ɩ( ) 0D   . We can then use 
(A2) to establish that  
 minD D  ,  
 2 2 1D Ƥƨ Ƥƨ     .  
 
(1 )
1 ƙ( )
(1 )(2 2 1 )
Ƥơ Ƥƨ
n Ƥ Ƥơ Ƥƨ Ƥƨ
 t  {    . (A8) 
However, notice that 2 2 1 (0,1)Ƥƨ Ƥƨ     by virtue of (A6). This implies that the 
restriction in (A8) ensures that the condition in (A4) is also satisfied.  
     Now, check that 2 2 1Ƥƨ Ƥƨ Ƥƨ!    . By virtue of (A8), this means that   
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(1 )
1
(1 )
Ƥơ Ƥƨ
n Ƥ ơ Ƥƨ
t    . (A9) 
Consequently, combining (A9) and (A5), we can establish that the trace T  is negative, i.e., 
( 2, 0)T    which, combined with (A3), reveals that both eigenvalues 1ƫ  and 2ƫ  are 
negative. It can be easily established that 2 1ƫ !  , whereas 1 1ƫ !   holds as long as   
 
2 4
1
2
T T D  !     
 22 4T T D !  .  
Given 2T !  , we can use the above expression to get     
 2 2 2(2 ) ( 4 )T T D !     
 4 4 4T D !     
 1 0D T  !    
 
1
2
Ƥƨ
D
! . (A10) 
which holds unambiguously when 1Ƥƨ d . Hence, in this case 2 10 1ƫ ƫ! ! !   holds – a 
result ensuring that there is convergence to the long-run equilibrium and that it is oscillatory 
(or cyclical).   
     Now consider the case where (1, 2]Ƥƨ  . The condition in (A10) can be written as      
 1 Ə( )n Ƥ  , (A11) 
where  
 
(1 ) 2Ə( )
1 1
Ƥơ ƤƨƤ Ƥ ơ Ƥƨ
{    . (A12) 
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Recalling that we are considering values for which (1, 2]Ƥƨ , we can determine that 
(1/ )
lim Ə( )
Ƥ ƨ
Ƥ
o
 f   and 2 3Ə 2 1 1
1
ơ
nƨ ơ
§ · § ·   ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹  by assumption. As long as Ə( )Ƥ  cuts 
the 1n   line only once, then there is Ƥ  such that Ə( ) 1Ƥ n  . Furthermore, note that for 
(1, 2]Ƥƨ  we have 1 2
12 2 1 ƤƨƤƨ Ƥƨ     . Given (A8), (A12) and the assumption 
3
1 2 1
1
ơ
n ơ
§ ·!  ¨ ¸© ¹ , this implies that Ə( ) ƙ( )Ƥ Ƥ!   2/Ƥ ƨ d , i.e., the condition in (A8) 
always holds given our assumptions.  
     The previous analysis implies that (A11) holds when Ƥ Ƥ   and therefore 
2 10 1ƫ ƫ! ! !  . The steady state Nˆ  is locally stable. However, when Ƥ Ƥ!   we have 
2 10 1ƫ ƫ! !  !   and the steady state Nˆ  is a saddle point. Evidently, at Ƥ Ƥ   we have 
1 1ƫ   . Combined with 2 ( 1, 0)ƫ   , we can use Theorem 8.4 in Azariadis (1993) to deduce 
that the dynamical system undergoes a flip (or period doubling) bifurcation so that there 
exists a 2-period cycle. 
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